My question is about certificates specifically in ssl but I think the questions should apply to all certificates. I have included the SSL procedure for the sake of clarity.
In SSL this is what I understand the procedure is:
1)Client
- sends supported crypto algorithms
- sends client nonce
- Server
- chooses (and sends) a
- symmetric algorithm
- a public key algorithm
- a MAC algorithm
- sends it's certificate
- sends server nonce
- Client
- verifies certificate
- Extracts public key
- Generates a pre-master secret key (pms)
- encrypts with servers public key and sends
- Client and Server
- compute master secrete (MS) from PMS and nonces
- PMS sliced to generate two encryption & two mac keys
- Client
- sends a mac of all handshakes (to ensure they were not previously modifide)
- Server
- sends a mac of all handshakes
Question
What stops a man in the middle attack from happening at step two? Why can't a man in the middle, say trudy, capture the certificate sent by the server and change the public key in it (to something it has the private key to).
I assume that the certificate is encrypted somehow.
However the server cannot encrypt the certificate because the client does not have the public key yet. When the server gets the key from an authority (like veri-sign) would the key be pre-encrypted using verisign's public key? I think this should work because all web browsers should have the public keys of most authorities.