3
votes

Is the following enough to prevent XSS from inside HTML elements?

function XSS_encode_html ( $str )
{
    $str = str_replace ( '&', "&", $str );
    $str = str_replace ( '<', "&lt;", $str );
    $str = str_replace ( '>', "&gt;", $str );
    $str = str_replace ( '"', " &quot;", $str );
    $str = str_replace ( '\'', " &#x27;", $str );
    $str = str_replace ( '/', "&#x2F;", $str );

    return $str;
}

As mentioned here: -
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Abridged_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#RULE_.231_-_HTML_Escape_Before_Inserting_Untrusted_Data_into_HTML_Element_Content


EDIT

I'm not using htmlspecialchars() because: -

  1. It does not change / to &#x2F;
  2. ' (single quote) becomes '&#039;' (or &apos;) when ENT_QUOTES is set.

According to OWASP, ' (single quote) should become &#x27; (call me pedantic) and,
&apos; not recommended because its not in the HTML spec


5
No. it's not. why are you reinventing the wheel when you could just htmlspecialchars()?Marc B
@MarcB: No, htmlspecialchars() does not follow the OWASP suggestion, PHP's a subset,M8R-1jmw5r
In what context would a so escaped value be used?Gumbo
@Gumbo : between HTLML elements, say <div> ... </div>, <b> ... </b>, etc.Fa773N M0nK
@MarcB: In which cases would it fail to prevent XSS from inside HTML elements?Fa773N M0nK

5 Answers

5
votes

Inside the content of an element, the only character that can be harmful is the start-tag delimiter < as it may denote the start of some markup declaration, whether it’s a start tag, an end tag, or a comment. So that character should always be escaped.

The other characters do not necessarily need to be escaped inside the content of an element.

The quotes do only need to be escaped inside tags, especially when used for attribute values that are either wrapped within the same quotes or not quoted at all. Similarly, the markup declaration close delimiter > does only need to be escaped inside the tags, here only when used in a unquoted attribute value. However, escaping plain ampersands as well is recommended to avoid them being interpreted as start of a character reference by mistake.

Now as for the the reason to replace / as well, it may either be due to a feature in SGML, the markup language HTML is adapted from, which allowed so called null end-tag:

To see how null end-tags work in practice consider its use in conjunction with an element which can be defined as:

<!ELEMENT ISBN  - -  CDATA --ISBN number-- >

Instead of entering an ISBN number as:

<ISBN>0 201 17535 5</ISBN>

we can use the null end-tag option to enter the element in the shortened form:

<ISBN/0 201 17535 5/

However, I’ve never seen this feature ever been implemented by any browser. HTML’s syntax rules has always been more strict than SGML syntax rules.

Another, more probable reason is the content model of so called raw text elements (script and style), which is plain text with the following restriction:

The text in raw text and RCDATA elements must not contain any occurrences of the string "</" (U+003C LESS-THAN SIGN, U+002F SOLIDUS) followed by characters that case-insensitively match the tag name of the element followed by one of "tab" (U+0009), "LF" (U+000A), "FF" (U+000C), "CR" (U+000D), U+0020 SPACE, ">" (U+003E), or "/" (U+002F).

Here it says that inside raw text elements such as script an occurrence of </script/ would denote the end tag:

<script>
alert(0</script/.exec("script").index)
</script>

Although perfectly valid JavaScript code, the end tag would be denoted by </script/. But besides that, the / does not prone any harm. And if you would allow arbitrary input being used in a JavaScript context only with escaping HTML, you’d be already doomed.

By the way, it doesn’t matter with what kind of character reference these characters are escaped, whether it’s named character references (i.e. entity references), or numeric character references, either in decimal or hexadecimal notation. They all reference the same characters.

2
votes

You should use htmlspecialchars:

$str = htmlspecialchars($str, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');

This is the documentation, basically does what's in your function but it's already implemented and it's more clean. However, it doesn't convert slashes and backslashes.

If you want to convert every character with a named HTML entity, you can use htmlentities:

$str = htmlentities($str, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');

It's documented here. If all you want to do is prevent XSS attacks and JS injection, I'd recommend the former as it has far lower overheads.

1
votes

Well this is a long one, but I feel like I'd be doing a disservice if I didn't share it. All code is taken directly from various parts of the source code of the latest stable release of Drupal and compiled into one area (as shown below). Very effective method of preventing XSS attacks.

Example usage:

$html = file_get_contents('http://example.com');
$output = filter_xss($html);
print $output;

Or:

$html = file_get_contents('http://example.com');
// Allow only <ul></ul>, <li></li>, and <p></p> tags.
$allowed_tags = array('ul', 'li', 'p');
$output = filter_xss($html, $allowed_tags);
print $output;

Here's the code required to run the above examples:

/**
 * Filters HTML to prevent cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
 *
 * Based on kses by Ulf Harnhammar, see http://sourceforge.net/projects/kses.
 * For examples of various XSS attacks, see: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html.
 *
 * This code does four things:
 * - Removes characters and constructs that can trick browsers.
 * - Makes sure all HTML entities are well-formed.
 * - Makes sure all HTML tags and attributes are well-formed.
 * - Makes sure no HTML tags contain URLs with a disallowed protocol (e.g.
 *   javascript:).
 *
 * @param $string
 *   The string with raw HTML in it. It will be stripped of everything that can
 *   cause an XSS attack.
 * @param $allowed_tags
 *   An array of allowed tags.
 *
 * @return
 *   An XSS safe version of $string, or an empty string if $string is not
 *   valid UTF-8.
 *
 * @see validate_utf8()
 * @ingroup sanitization
 */
function filter_xss($string, $allowed_tags = array('a', 'em', 'strong', 'cite', 'blockquote', 'code', 'ul', 'ol', 'li', 'dl', 'dt', 'dd')) {
  // Only operate on valid UTF-8 strings. This is necessary to prevent cross
  // site scripting issues on Internet Explorer 6.
  if (!validate_utf8($string)) {
    return '';
  }
  // Store the text format.
  _filter_xss_split($allowed_tags, TRUE);
  // Remove NULL characters (ignored by some browsers).
  $string = str_replace(chr(0), '', $string);
  // Remove Netscape 4 JS entities.
  $string = preg_replace('%&\s*\{[^}]*(\}\s*;?|$)%', '', $string);

  // Defuse all HTML entities.
  $string = str_replace('&', '&amp;', $string);
  // Change back only well-formed entities in our whitelist:
  // Decimal numeric entities.
  $string = preg_replace('/&amp;#([0-9]+;)/', '&#\1', $string);
  // Hexadecimal numeric entities.
  $string = preg_replace('/&amp;#[Xx]0*((?:[0-9A-Fa-f]{2})+;)/', '&#x\1', $string);
  // Named entities.
  $string = preg_replace('/&amp;([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9]*;)/', '&\1', $string);

  return preg_replace_callback('%
    (
    <(?=[^a-zA-Z!/])  # a lone <
    |                 # or
    <!--.*?-->        # a comment
    |                 # or
    <[^>]*(>|$)       # a string that starts with a <, up until the > or the end of the string
    |                 # or
    >                 # just a >
    )%x', '_filter_xss_split', $string);
}

/**
 * Processes an HTML tag.
 *
 * @param $m
 *   An array with various meaning depending on the value of $store.
 *   If $store is TRUE then the array contains the allowed tags.
 *   If $store is FALSE then the array has one element, the HTML tag to process.
 * @param $store
 *   Whether to store $m.
 *
 * @return
 *   If the element isn't allowed, an empty string. Otherwise, the cleaned up
 *   version of the HTML element.
 */
function _filter_xss_split($m, $store = FALSE) {
  static $allowed_html;

  if ($store) {
    $allowed_html = array_flip($m);
    return;
  }

  $string = $m[1];

  if (substr($string, 0, 1) != '<') {
    // We matched a lone ">" character.
    return '&gt;';
  }
  elseif (strlen($string) == 1) {
    // We matched a lone "<" character.
    return '&lt;';
  }

  if (!preg_match('%^<\s*(/\s*)?([a-zA-Z0-9]+)([^>]*)>?|(<!--.*?-->)$%', $string, $matches)) {
    // Seriously malformed.
    return '';
  }

  $slash = trim($matches[1]);
  $elem = &$matches[2];
  $attrlist = &$matches[3];
  $comment = &$matches[4];

  if ($comment) {
    $elem = '!--';
  }

  if (!isset($allowed_html[strtolower($elem)])) {
    // Disallowed HTML element.
    return '';
  }

  if ($comment) {
    return $comment;
  }

  if ($slash != '') {
    return "</$elem>";
  }

  // Is there a closing XHTML slash at the end of the attributes?
  $attrlist = preg_replace('%(\s?)/\s*$%', '\1', $attrlist, -1, $count);
  $xhtml_slash = $count ? ' /' : '';

  // Clean up attributes.
  $attr2 = implode(' ', _filter_xss_attributes($attrlist));
  $attr2 = preg_replace('/[<>]/', '', $attr2);
  $attr2 = strlen($attr2) ? ' ' . $attr2 : '';

  return "<$elem$attr2$xhtml_slash>";
}

/**
 * Processes a string of HTML attributes.
 *
 * @return
 *   Cleaned up version of the HTML attributes.
 */
function _filter_xss_attributes($attr) {
  $attrarr = array();
  $mode = 0;
  $attrname = '';

  while (strlen($attr) != 0) {
    // Was the last operation successful?
    $working = 0;

    switch ($mode) {
      case 0:
        // Attribute name, href for instance.
        if (preg_match('/^([-a-zA-Z]+)/', $attr, $match)) {
          $attrname = strtolower($match[1]);
          $skip = ($attrname == 'style' || substr($attrname, 0, 2) == 'on');
          $working = $mode = 1;
          $attr = preg_replace('/^[-a-zA-Z]+/', '', $attr);
        }
        break;

      case 1:
        // Equals sign or valueless ("selected").
        if (preg_match('/^\s*=\s*/', $attr)) {
          $working = 1; $mode = 2;
          $attr = preg_replace('/^\s*=\s*/', '', $attr);
          break;
        }

        if (preg_match('/^\s+/', $attr)) {
          $working = 1; $mode = 0;
          if (!$skip) {
            $attrarr[] = $attrname;
          }
          $attr = preg_replace('/^\s+/', '', $attr);
        }
        break;

      case 2:
        // Attribute value, a URL after href= for instance.
        if (preg_match('/^"([^"]*)"(\s+|$)/', $attr, $match)) {
          $thisval = filter_xss_bad_protocol($match[1]);

          if (!$skip) {
            $attrarr[] = "$attrname=\"$thisval\"";
          }
          $working = 1;
          $mode = 0;
          $attr = preg_replace('/^"[^"]*"(\s+|$)/', '', $attr);
          break;
        }

        if (preg_match("/^'([^']*)'(\s+|$)/", $attr, $match)) {
          $thisval = filter_xss_bad_protocol($match[1]);

          if (!$skip) {
            $attrarr[] = "$attrname='$thisval'";
          }
          $working = 1; $mode = 0;
          $attr = preg_replace("/^'[^']*'(\s+|$)/", '', $attr);
          break;
        }

        if (preg_match("%^([^\s\"']+)(\s+|$)%", $attr, $match)) {
          $thisval = filter_xss_bad_protocol($match[1]);

          if (!$skip) {
            $attrarr[] = "$attrname=\"$thisval\"";
          }
          $working = 1; $mode = 0;
          $attr = preg_replace("%^[^\s\"']+(\s+|$)%", '', $attr);
        }
        break;
    }

    if ($working == 0) {
      // Not well formed; remove and try again.
      $attr = preg_replace('/
        ^
        (
        "[^"]*("|$)     # - a string that starts with a double quote, up until the next double quote or the end of the string
        |               # or
        \'[^\']*(\'|$)| # - a string that starts with a quote, up until the next quote or the end of the string
        |               # or
        \S              # - a non-whitespace character
        )*              # any number of the above three
        \s*             # any number of whitespaces
        /x', '', $attr);
      $mode = 0;
    }
  }

  // The attribute list ends with a valueless attribute like "selected".
  if ($mode == 1 && !$skip) {
    $attrarr[] = $attrname;
  }
  return $attrarr;
}

/**
 * Processes an HTML attribute value and strips dangerous protocols from URLs.
 *
 * @param $string
 *   The string with the attribute value.
 * @param $decode
 *   (deprecated) Whether to decode entities in the $string. Set to FALSE if the
 *   $string is in plain text, TRUE otherwise. Defaults to TRUE.
 *
 * @return
 *   Cleaned up and HTML-escaped version of $string.
 */
function filter_xss_bad_protocol($string, $decode = TRUE) {
  // Get the plain text representation of the attribute value (i.e. its meaning).
  if ($decode) {

    $string = decode_entities($string);
  }
  return check_plain(strip_dangerous_protocols($string));
}

/**
 * Strips dangerous protocols (e.g. 'javascript:') from a URI.
 *
 * @param $uri
 *   A plain-text URI that might contain dangerous protocols.
 *
 * @return
 *   A plain-text URI stripped of dangerous protocols. As with all plain-text
 *   strings, this return value must not be output to an HTML page without
 *   check_plain() being called on it. However, it can be passed to functions
 *   expecting plain-text strings.
 *
 */
function strip_dangerous_protocols($uri) {
  static $allowed_protocols;

  if (!isset($allowed_protocols)) {
    $allowed_protocols = array_flip(array('ftp', 'http', 'https', 'irc', 'mailto', 'news', 'nntp', 'rtsp', 'sftp', 'ssh', 'tel', 'telnet', 'webcal'));
  }

  // Iteratively remove any invalid protocol found.
  do {
    $before = $uri;
    $colonpos = strpos($uri, ':');
    if ($colonpos > 0) {
      // We found a colon, possibly a protocol. Verify.
      $protocol = substr($uri, 0, $colonpos);
      // If a colon is preceded by a slash, question mark or hash, it cannot
      // possibly be part of the URL scheme. This must be a relative URL, which
      // inherits the (safe) protocol of the base document.
      if (preg_match('![/?#]!', $protocol)) {
        break;
      }
      // Check if this is a disallowed protocol. Per RFC2616, section 3.2.3
      // (URI Comparison) scheme comparison must be case-insensitive.
      if (!isset($allowed_protocols[strtolower($protocol)])) {
        $uri = substr($uri, $colonpos + 1);
      }
    }
  } while ($before != $uri);

  return $uri;
}

/**
 * Encodes special characters in a plain-text string for display as HTML.
 *
 * Also validates strings as UTF-8 to prevent cross site scripting attacks on
 * Internet Explorer 6.
 *
 * @param $text
 *   The text to be checked or processed.
 *
 * @return
 *   An HTML safe version of $text, or an empty string if $text is not
 *   valid UTF-8.
 *
 * @see validate_utf8()
 * @ingroup sanitization
 */
function check_plain($text) {
  return htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
}

/**
 * Decodes all HTML entities (including numerical ones) to regular UTF-8 bytes.
 *
 * Double-escaped entities will only be decoded once ("&amp;lt;" becomes "&lt;"
 * , not "<"). Be careful when using this function, as decode_entities can
 * revert previous sanitization efforts (&lt;script&gt; will become <script>).
 *
 * @param $text
 *   The text to decode entities in.
 *
 * @return
 *   The input $text, with all HTML entities decoded once.
 */
function decode_entities($text) {
  return html_entity_decode($text, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
}

/**
 * Checks whether a string is valid UTF-8.
 *
 * All functions designed to filter input should use validate_utf8
 * to ensure they operate on valid UTF-8 strings to prevent bypass of the
 * filter.
 *
 * When text containing an invalid UTF-8 lead byte (0xC0 - 0xFF) is presented
 * as UTF-8 to Internet Explorer 6, the program may misinterpret subsequent
 * bytes. When these subsequent bytes are HTML control characters such as
 * quotes or angle brackets, parts of the text that were deemed safe by filters
 * end up in locations that are potentially unsafe; An onerror attribute that
 * is outside of a tag, and thus deemed safe by a filter, can be interpreted
 * by the browser as if it were inside the tag.
 *
 * The function does not return FALSE for strings containing character codes
 * above U+10FFFF, even though these are prohibited by RFC 3629.
 *
 * @param $text
 *   The text to check.
 *
 * @return
 *   TRUE if the text is valid UTF-8, FALSE if not.
 */
function validate_utf8($text) {
  if (strlen($text) == 0) {
    return TRUE;
  }
  // With the PCRE_UTF8 modifier 'u', preg_match() fails silently on strings
  // containing invalid UTF-8 byte sequences. It does not reject character
  // codes above U+10FFFF (represented by 4 or more octets), though.
  return (preg_match('/^./us', $text) == 1);
}
0
votes

For perl script or cgi, you can use HTML::Entities:

use HTML::Entities;

$str = encode_entities($str, '<>&"');
-1
votes

You can use the stripslashes() function.

    $str = stripslashes($str);