OWASP says this about CSRF and GET requests:
The ideal solution is to only include the CSRF token in POST requests
and modify server-side actions that have state changing affect to only
respond to POST requests. This is in fact what the RFC 2616 requires
for GET requests. If sensitive server-side actions are guaranteed to
only ever respond to POST requests, then there is no need to include
the token in GET requests.
Also, OWASP notes:
Many implementations of this control include the challenge token in
GET (URL) requests [...] while this control does help mitigate the risk
of CSRF attacks, the unique per-session token is being exposed for GET
requests. CSRF tokens in GET requests are potentially leaked at
several locations: browser history, HTTP log files, network appliances
that make a point to log the first line of an HTTP request, and
Referrer headers if the protected site links to an external site.
The trouble here is that if a user's token is leaked, you're still vulnerable - and it's all too easy to leak the token. I'm not sure that there's a good answer to your question that doesn't involve converting all of those GET requests to POST requests.
It's worth noting that the Viewstate feature in ASP.NET WebForms does offer some protection against CSRF, though it's very limited - in fact, it also only protects POSTback requests.
To state this more simply, you shouldn't use a GET request as an entry point to any function that does something beyond return a read only resource for a browser to render. So don't have an AJAX script make a GET based call to a URL like transferMoney.aspx?fromAcct=xyz&toAcct=abc&amount=20
.
The HTTP specification states explicitly that HTTP GET requests should not have side effects. It's considered best practice to keep your GET requests idempotent whenever possible.
I've written an article about protecting ASP.NET MVC against CSRF, it spells out a practical approach to applying the AntiForgeryToken
to POST controller methods on your site.